THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING ADEQUATE:
DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS IN CLASS ACTIONS
UNDER FEDERAL RULE 23
I.

INTRODUCTION

When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended
in 1966, rule 23 was completely rewritten.' Since then class actions have flourished, and most of them have been of the "common question" variety authorized by subdivision (b)(3), in which
members of the class are related to one another only because
their respective positions with regard to an adverse party2 are
linked by common questions of law or fact; they are not united
by prior legal relationships. 3 One of the more radical of the 1966
amendments extended the binding effect of class action judgments to absent members of classes in (b)(3) actions, the category
which, because of the lack of unity of interests among the members of the class, offers the least protection to absentees. The
draftsmen of amended rule 23, concerned that their expansion
of the binding effect of a judgment not deprive absent class
members of due process of law, erected procedures designed to
give some additional protection to absentees.
R. Civ. P. 23(b) now provides:
Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if

'FED.

(I) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of
the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the
party opposing the class; or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members
not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to
protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair
and efficient adjudication of the controversy. ...
Throughout the rest of this Comment, the party adverse to the class will be called
"the opposing party." This term seems least likely to cause confusion. The rule itself
refers to "the part)' opposing the class," FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), but this appellation
could connote the narrower meaning of opposition to maintenance of the suit as a class
action. Use of the phrase "adverse party" would be confusingin light of this Comment's
discussion of adverse interests within the class.
3 C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 312 (1970).
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As amended, rule 23 is replete with procedural safeguards
that were lacking in the original rule. Subdivision (a) establishes
prerequisites to the maintenance of any class action, 4 and subdivision (c) requires the trial court to make an early determination of whether the class action is to be maintained and to
provide for notice to members of the class. 5 In class actions
maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the rule requires that "the
best notice practicable under the circumstances" be sent to members of the class; this requirement is an additional safeguard to
(b)(3) class members beyond the basic protection afforded by
subdivision (a). Unresolved on the face of the rule is the question
of how much weight each of its safeguards has in relation to the
others. Most troublesome is the question of the relative importance of the mandatory (c)(2) notice requirement in (b)(3) actions
and the requirement of subdivision (a)(4) that in all class actions
the class representative "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class."
Analysis of the interaction of the notice and adequate representation requirements usually occurs in cases in which the
notice requirement is unfulfilled. Absent class members who
have not received notice of the suit seek to avoid the res judicata
effect of the judgment, or the opposing party argues that the
named party cannot proceed with the suit unless he is able to
provide notice to all absent class members. 6 In each case, the
4 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) provides:
Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1), the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of
law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
n FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c) provides in part:
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall
direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the
court will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the
judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may, if he
desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and
describe those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The judgment
in an action maintained as a class action tinder subdivision (b)(3), whether or not
favorable to the class, shall include and specify or describe those to whom the
notice provided in subdivision (c)(2) was directed, and who have not requested
exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the class.
6 The most important recent case of the latter variety is Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
417 U.S. 156 (1974) (Eisen III).
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party contending that the judgment is binding on absentees argues that fair and adequate representation, without notice, can
fulfill the requirements of due process for a representative suit.7
Rarely has the inquiry proceeded in the opposite direction
to ask whether notice alone, absent, adequate representation, can
satisfy the requirements of due process. A recent Tenth Circuit
case, In re Four Seasons Securities Laws Litigation,8 is one of the few
cases in which parties asked a court to hold that notice, by itself,
can satisfy due process.9 The question presented in Four Seasons
was whether an absent class member who had received adequate
notice'0 could obtain relief from the judgment by arguing that
its interests had not been fairly and adequately protected by the
named plaintiffs, thereby denying due process of law and
rendering the judgment void as to the absentee.
The court in Four Seasons denied the absentee relief from
judgment, holding that "due process may be satisfied by notice
alone and that, where due process is thus satisfied, adequacy of
representation need not be shown as a matter of constitutional
necessity."" The proposition embodied in this holding seems to
be wrong, and this Comment will attempt to demonstrate that
receipt of notice by absent members of a class in a (b)(3)
-"common question"--class action should not preclude those
absentees from attacking the judgment, as to them, on the
ground of lack of adequate representation required by rule
23(a)(4). Notice may not substitute for adequate representation.
The notice requirement in rule 23 is only a component of the
requirement of adequate representation; and the purpose of the
former is to buttress the latter, helping to ensure that absentees
are accorded due process of law. The Four Seasons case presents
the issue; ironically, it is an extreme case that warrants an exception to the proposed rule.
A.

The Rule

One of the draftsmen's purposes in amending rule 23 was to
rid the rule of its typing of class actions in terms of "the abstract
See, e.g., zd. at 176.
8 502 F.2d 834 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 516 (1974).
g Other cases holding absentees bound by a judgment after having received notice
are collected in note 138 infra, but none of them deals squarely with the interaction of the
(a)(4) and (c)(2) requirements.
10There was a question in the suit whether the one notice sent had issued pursuant
to rule 23(c)(2) or 23(e), or both, see note 52 infra, but the court held that notice had been
adequate.
1 502 F.2d at 843.
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nature of the rights involved." 2 The "spurious" class action was
particularly vexing. The judgment in such an action extended
only to the named parties and to parties who intervened, unlike
the judgment in a "true" or "hybrid" suit which bound the whole
class.' 3 Courts had trouble deciding which label to apply to a
particular action, and the spurious action proved to be an
"anomaly because, although denominated a 'class' action and
pleaded as such, it was supposed not to adjudicate the rights or
' 4
liabilities of any person not a [named] party.'
The anomaly was more than academic. Because judgments
in spurious class actions bound only named parties and intervenors, the rule was little more than a permissive joinder device.
It was hard to see how it added anything to rule 20, the permissive joinder provision of the Federal Rules.' 5 Furthermore, some
courts broadened the spurious class action rule by allowing intervention after rendition of judgment, a practice tantamount to
taking bets after the race has been run. They justified this socalled "one-way intervention" on two grounds: first, any person
who could qualify as a member of the class should be entitled to
benefit along with the rest of the class;' 6 and second, allowing
post-judgment intervention differentiates the class action device
from permissive joinder. 1 7 Some courts and commentators criticized the spurious class action rule as superfluous' 8 while others
12 Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 98 (1966). The three categories set out in

the original rule were defined as follows: "the so-called 'true' category was defined as
involving 'joint, common, or secondary rights'; the 'hybrid' category, as involving 'several'
rights related to 'specific property'; the 'spurious' category, as involving 'several' rights
affected by a common question and related to common relief." Id.
13Id.
14Id. 99.
15 The intended advantage of the spurious category was "that it would invite deci-

sions that a member of the 'class' could, like a member of the class in a 'true' or 'hybrid'
action, intervene on an ancillary basis without being required to show an independent
basis of Federal jurisdiction ....These results were obtained in some instances but not in
others." Id.
M See, e.g., Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemnporay Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI.

L. REv. 684, 695-701 (1941): "We have pointed out that the basic function of the class
suit is achieved only if the decree is held open to permit the absentee members of the
class to come tinder the decree after the decision and thus obtain the benefits of litigation .... "
17Id. 700.
1 See, e.g., Rank v. (Krug) United States, 142 F. Sipp. 1, 154-55 n.93 (S.D. Cal.

1956):
Either Rule 23 is inconsistent within itself by calling for adequacy of representation and yet permitting a suit thereunder which does not culminate in a
binding decree despite satisfaction of due process, or the Rule is consistent and
permits as class suits only those in which the decree will bind absent parties

virtually present.
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tried to avoid the anomaly by attributing more latitude to the
rule than it could reasonably, or equitably, bear. 19 Neither resolution of the problem was satisfactory.
Amended rule 23 abolished the spurious class action and
replaced it with subdivision (b)(3). Judgments in class actions
maintained under subdivision (b)(3) bind all members of the
class described in the judgment. 20 Under subdivision (b)(3),
"[t]he court is required to find, as a condition of holding that a
class action may be maintained . . . , that the questions common
to the class predominate over the questions affecting individual
members."12 1 A (b)(3) action differs from the other kinds of class
actions authorized by the rule in two major respects. First, subdivision (c)(2) requires that notice be sent to subdivision (b)(3)
absentees; second, subdivision (c)(2) permits a (b)(3) absentee to
exclude himself from the class and thereby escape the binding
effect of the judgment. Subdivision (b)(3) absentees who fail to
exclude themselves within a time prescribed by the court are
included in the judgment, as are all absentees in (b)(1) and (b)(2)
class actions. Thus, under the amended rule the scope of the
binding effect of the old "spurious" class action is broadened
beyond named parties and intervenors, but constricted to preclude post-judgment intervention.
B.

The Problem:A Case in Point

In re Four Seasons Securities Laws Litigation22 was a set of actions brought by creditor-stockholders against the former officers, directors, accountants, and investment bankers of various
corporations related to Four Seasons Nursing Centers of
America, Inc. The actions were consolidated by order of the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation in the Western District
of Oklahoma and were captioned "M.D.L. 55." Prior to these
proceedings, many of the same creditors and the State of Ohio
had participated in reorganization proceedings to recover loans
made to the insolvent corporations. The State of Ohio, an ordinary creditor of the Four Seasons companies, had objected to the
"E.g., Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 16; Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v.
Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 588-89 (10th Cir. 1961). For a selective compilation of conflicting
views on the propriety of "one-way intervention," see cases and authorities cited in
Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 105 (1966).
20 A judgment which will "include" all members of the class is not necessarily the
same as a judgment which "binds" them all. The former phrase refers only to the scope
of the judgment when rendered. A court may not determine the resjudicata effect of its
own judgment. See text accompanying notes 128-31 infra.
2 1 Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 103 (1966).
22 502 F.2d 834 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 516 (1974).
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inclusion of creditor-stockholders in the plan of reorganization
and filed three suits of its own against Four Seasons.
The trial court designated five actions as class actions and
tentatively defined two plaintiff classes. Ohio was a member of
one of those classes. No notice was initially sent to any absent
member of the proposed classes, however, because all counsel
present asked the court to delay final determination of the
classes and sending of notice so that the parties could attempt
settlement negotiations. Counsel in M.D.L. 55 subsequently presented to the judge a proposed settlement, and the court entered
an order preliminarily approving the settlement and directing
that notice be sent to members of the two described plaintiff
classes.
Although the Office of the Attorney General of Ohio received two copies of the notice, neither those copies nor the
notice published in the Wall Street Journal was read by anyone
in the Office. Ohio continued to negotiate with the trustee of the
defendant corporation to settle Ohio's three appeals contesting
the plan of reorganization and its allocation of shares in the
reorganized company to credit-stockholders. Ohio assumed it
was not included in either of the M.D.L. 55 classes and failed to
request exclusion. Counsel for Ohio did not read the whole
order of the court until the deadline for opting-out had passed;
later Ohio moved for relief from judgment under rule 60(b)(1),
(4), and (6).23
The district court granted relief from judgment without relying exclusively on any particular one of the rule 60(b)
categories. It found that Ohio had made a strong case that the
judgment was void under rule 60(b)(4), remarking that the difference between Ohio's claims and those of other class members
cast doubt on the adequacy of representation. In addition, the
court gave some weight, under rule 60(b)(6), to the course of
dealings between counsel for the defendants in Four Seasons
(which Ohio termed "lulling"), although it had held earlier in the
opinion that the course of dealing did not excuse Ohio's neglect
under rule 60(b)(1). The court based its grant of relief on the
"totality of the evidence" under the circumstances.
23 FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) provides in part:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; . . . (4) the
judgment is void; ... or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation
of the judgment.
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The court of appeals reversed, finding that the district
court's decision had been based on the erroneous conclusion that
Ohio had been denied due process of law. 24 The court of ap-

peals found no due process violation because Ohio had received
sufficient notice. Under its view, fulfillment of the notice requirement of subdivision (c)(2) is a sufficient condition to support a judgment binding absentees.25 In context this conclusion
makes sense. Ohio had received not only notice of the suit, but
also notice of the settlement hearing and of the terms of the
proposed settlement, "the very terms of the impending
judgment. '26 Ohio was "presented with the unique opportunity
of judging, retrospectively, whether its interests had been adequately represented at a time when it was capable of excluding
itself if not satisfied. 27
The unusual factual setting of FourSeasons justifies the decision of the court of appeals; but the holding obscures the real
problem, suggested by the case, as it may come up in future
litigation. That problem is whether notice of the pendency of a
(b)(3)--"common question"--class action, without more, deprives
an absentee of his right to fair and adequate representation.2 8
24For purposes of this Comment, it suffices to say that the court of appeals believed
the lower court opinion to have been based on due process grounds, and based its
reversal on due process grounds. It should be noted that the district court's "totality of
the evidence" standard could easily have been iriterpreted by the court of appeals as a
decision under (b)(6) of rule 60-the "other reasons" clause-and reversed on that
ground. The district court, after canvassing the evidence under rule 60(b)(1) and (b)(4),
refused to base its decision on either clause, but it used the same evidence to grant relief
on the "totality of the circumstances" (i.e., arguably, rule 60(b)(6)). It is well settled,
however, that a motion under rule 60(b)(6) should be granted only if the motion is based
on "some reason other than those stated in clauses (1)-(5)" and that although rule 60(b)(6) is to
be construed liberally, it should only apply to situations "not covered in the preceding
five clauses," 7 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.27[1], at 343 (2d ed. 1974); see Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 613-15 (1949) (opinion of Black, J.); United States
v. Erdoss, 440 F.2d 1221, 1223 (2d Cir. 1971); Rinieri v. News Syndicate Co., 385 F.2d
818, 822 .(2d Cir. 1967). But see In re Four Seasons Securities Laws Litigation, 502 F.2d
834, 841 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 516 (1974). The court of appeals in Four Seasons
found it unnecessary to pinpoint which of the 60(b) clauses was the basis of the decision,
and focused instead on the merits of the due process issue.
25 502 F.2d at 843.
26

Id.
27 Id.

28 A distinction could be made between the right to adequate representation as a
prerequisite to maintenance of a class action and the right not to be bound by a judgment
already rendered in a suit in which representation was inadequate. Under such a distinction, the finding of adequate representation as a prerequisite might be said to preclude a
later suit attacking the binding effect of the judgment because of inadequate representation. The distinction is specious, however, because the requirement of adequate representation as a prerequisite is intended to ensure satisfaction of due process requirements so that the judgment can be held binding if attacked later. If an absentee cannot
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The Four Seasons court felt unguided in its decision because "due
process requirements under the facts presented here have [not]
yet been articulated.

'2 9

This Comment proposes to aid in the

articulation of those requirements.
II.

THE REQUIREMENTS OF

DUE

PROCESS

IN A CLASS ACTION

The procedural context of the Four Seasons case was a motion for relief from judgment under rule 60(b). The case involved a direct attack on the original judgment, rather than a
collateral attack in a subsequent suit; but because the court of
appeals treated the case as having been decided under rule
60(b)(4)-"the judgment is void"-the case raises the same issues
as would a collateral attack.3 0 The party moving for relief did
not allege that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the subject
matter or over the parties, so the judgment could be found void
only if the court had proceeded "in such an arbitrary or improper manner that its action may be said to constitute a denial of
due process." 31 The nature and requirements of due process for
a class action concern us here.
A. Adequate Representation
Adequate representation by the named party of the interests
of absent parties is a requirement of due process in a class suit.
The leading case on adequate representation is Hansberry v.
Lee, 32 a suit against landowners who had violated the terms of a
racially restrictive covenant. The plaintiffs, homeowners seeking
to enforce the terms of the covenant, argued that a prior
judgment3 3 in favor of other homeowners seeking to enforce
the restriction barred the present defendants from challenging
the covenant's validity. The Supreme Court of Illinois held the
attack a judgment (either directly or collaterally) on due process grounds, it matters little
that he was entitled to adequate representation during the suit. See generally notes 166-73
infra & accompanying text.
29 502 F.2d at 843.
30 Note, CollateralAttack on the Binding Effect of Class Action Judgments, 87 HARV. L.

REV. 589, 598 & n.55 (1974).
31 7 J. MooRE, supra note 24, 60.25[2], at 309; see Bass v. Hoagland, 172 F.2d 205
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 816 (1949). But cf. notes 45-46 infra & accompanying text.
The district court granted Ohio relief under rule 60(b)(6)-"any other reason justifying
relief"-the court of appeals treated the decision as having been based on the view that
Ohio was denied due process of law. This ground would be cognizable only under rule
60(b)(4). See also note 21 supra.
32 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
33 Burke v. Kleiman, 277 Ill. App. 519, 189 N.E. 372 (1934).
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validity of the covenant to be res judicata, 34 even though a factual stipulation upon which the first judgment was based turned
out to be false. 35 Since the court considered the original suit to
have been a "class" or "representative" suit, it held the defendants, now36seeking relief from the covenant, bound by the prior
judgment.
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, enunciating the basic requirements of due process in a class action. The
Court ruled that the defendants could not be bound by the prior
judgment for two reasons. First, the plaintiffs in the prior litigation could not be considered members of the same class as the
to enforce the
defendants in Hansberry.37 The former sought
38
covenant while the latter wanted to violate it.
It is plain that in such circumstances all those alleged to
be bound by the agreement would not constitute a
single class in any litigation brought to enforce it. Those
who sought to secure its benefits by enforcing it could
not be said to be in the same class with or represent
those whose interest was in resisting performance .... 39
The Supreme Court of Illinois had failed to perceive, or had
chosen to disregard, the obvious point that all the homeowners
34 Lee v. Hansberry, 372 Ill. 369, 24 N.E.2d 37 (1939).
35Id. at 372-74, 24 N.E.2d at 38-40. The parties in the original suit, Burke v.

Kleiman, 277 Il. App. 519, 189 N.E. 372 (1934), had stipulated that the condition
precedent to the covenant's taking effect had been satisfied. It turned out that the
condition had not been met: only fifty-four percent of the homeowners had signed the
covenant; ninety-five percent were required for the restrictions to take effect.
36 The majority's reliance on the stipulation as res judicata went not only to the
merits but also to the question whether the court had jurisdiction over the absentees in
order to hold them bound. The defendants in Hansberry had argued in the Supreme
Court of Illinois that there was no class, because the class of parties to the covenant could
only come into being when ninety-five percent of the homeowners had signed. Even if
homeowners who sought enforcement could be said to have represented homeowners
who wanted to sell, because all made up one class, that class had never come into being.
372 Ill. at 373, 24 N.E.2d at 39.
The dissenting judges agreed:
[I]t seems obvious that until those signatures were obtained and the very terms
of the agreement itself complied with, there could by no possibility be even the
semblance of a class to be represented in a class suit, even if such a suit could be
possible under the circumstances ....
Id. at 380, 24 N.E.2d at 42. (Shaw & Murphy, JJ., dissenting).
37 311 U.S. at 44.
38 Of course the Supreme Court of Illinois could have said that defendants in Burke
had represented defendants in Hansbeny, so that the)' were all members of the same class
and had the same interests. But, as the United States Supreme Court noted, the defendants in Burke never purported to represent anyone or have anyone bound by the result
of their litigation. Id. at 45.
39 Id. at 44.
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did not constitute a single class such that any of its "members"
could speak for all the others. The United States Supreme Court
corrected the mistake and made plain what already should have
been so: persons will not be bound by a judgment in a class suit
if they are not members of the class.
The Court's second point, dealing with adequacy of representation, is the facet of the decision that has been emphasized
in subsequent cases. The Court, relying upon what it described
as the "familiar doctrine of the federal courts," held that "members of a class not present as parties to the litigation may be
bound by the judgment where they are in fact adequately represented by parties who are present ....
"40 Finding an absence
of adequate representation, the Court refused to hold the prior
judgment binding on the so-called class members who had been
absent from the proceedings.
Hansberry is usually cited for its holding on adequate representation, and it is rarely noted that the main basis of the
decision was that the homeowners seeking to violate the covenant could not possibly have been considered members of the
41
class of homeowners who had previously sought to enforce it.
A class so defined would have defied reason. The two thrusts of
Hansberry go together: persons absent from the prosecution of
litigation may be bound by that litigation only "[1] where the
interests of those not joined are of the same class as the interests
of those who are, and [2] where it is considered that the latter
fairly represent the former ....-42 In most cases the first requirement will be met rather easily but the second will require
close scrutiny by the court. In Hansberry the Court found that the
first requirement was not met and indicated that, a fortiori,
neither was the second.
Id. at 42-43.
The language of the opinion and its repeated emphasis of this point support the
view that the main basis of the decision was the difference in classes. Phrases such as the
following abound in the opinion: " ... provided that the procedure were so devised and
applied as to insure that those present are of the same class as those absent .
I d. at
43.
One commentator both advanced and rejected the argument that the real rationale
for the decision in Hansbenry was that two distinct classes were involved. He rejected the
argument on the grounds that if the existence of two classes was the basis for decision,
then: (1) there was no need for the Court to discuss the adequacy of representation; and
(2) there would have been no need to discuss the resjudicata effects of the first decision,
when it is plain that one class could not represent another. Note, Proposed Rule 23: Class
Actions Reclassified, 51 VA. L. REv. 629, 637-38 (1965). These two objections are hollow.
The Court had to discuss the resjudicata issue because it formed the basis of the Illinois
court's holding; and its discussion of adequate representation was integrally related to the
finding of separate classes.
42311 U.S. at41.
40
4
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The odd circumstances of Hansberry, that the absentees
should never have been included in the class of the priorlitigation plaintiffs, might be thought to make unnecessary, or to
relegate to dictum, the Court's discussion of adequate representation. But such a conclusion misses the point. The Court appreciated that both requirements bear upon the power of the
court to render judgment; the problem is one of jurisdiction.
The defendants in Hansberry stated "want of jurisdiction" as a
43
ground for reversal of the Illinois Supreme Court judgment.
They meant that the earlier litigation could not be resjudicata as
to them because they had never appeared before the court or
been named as parties. A court has jurisdiction over absent
members of a class, an exception to traditional principles of
jurisdiction, only by virtue of its jurisdiction over the class
representative. 44 If the supposed absentees are not even members of the class, they are not represented by anyone and have
not had their day in court. The same can be said of absentees
who have not been represented fairly and adequately: if the
representation has not been adequate, the absent class members
have not had their day in court through the appearance of
the named representative, even if the absentees are bona fide
class members. 45 Want of due process flows from lack of ju43

Id. at 35 (Argument for Respondents).

44See, e.g., Calgaz v. Calhoon, 309 F.2d 248, 254 (5th Cir. 1962).
45 Hansberry illustrates the extreme situation of absentee interests completely adverse

to those of the "representatives." Given this adversity, it was clear that the absentees
could not be deemed members of the representative parties' "class."
Less extreme situations could contain the seeds of adversity within the class which
might result in a denial of due process to absentees. Adequate representation, though
only one of the prerequisites enumerated in clause (a) of the rule, has come to embrace
several of the other requirements of rule 23, including ones in (b)(3), see note 46 infra,
and (a)(3).
Clauses (a)(3) and (a)(4) require, respectively, that "the claims or defenses of the
representative parties [be] typical of the claims or defenses of the class" (typicality), and
that "the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class" (adequate representation). Situations satisfying (a)(3) will probably also satisfy
(a)(4), unless the representative and his counsel prove iricompetent in handling the litigation. At the outset, however, it would appear to a trial court that persons with interests
typical of the class' would be able to protect the absentees' interests. On the other hand,
it would take an extremely altruistic litigant to represent an entire class in costly and
time-consuming litigation if their interests differed from his. Thus the typicality requirement is usually part of the requirement of adequate representation. See Rosado v.
Wyman, 322 F. Supp. 1173, 1193 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd on other grounds, 437 F.2d 619 (2d Cir.
1970), aff'd inen., 402 U.S. 991 (1971). Cases in which absentees alleged that the
representative's interests were atypical, like Brennan v. Midwestern Life Ins. Co., 450
F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1971) and Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d "*7(5th Cir. 1973), discussed
in text accompanying notes 166-73 infra, make clear that a prime cause of atypicality may
be differences, inherent in one's posture as absentee or as part)' of record, concerning
procedural matters during the trial. See note 145 infra.
The (a)(3) and (a)(4) requirements retain their independent significance when the
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46

Although Hansberry is considered the Court's principal articulation of the proposition that adequate representation is essential to holding a judgment binding on absentees, the case is
distinguishable from modern "common question" class actions in
substantial ways. The Supreme Court of Illinois discussed the
case as though it had been a class action, but the suit was not
brought as a class action and could not have come under the
original version of rule 23, as it was brought in a state court. The
parties purportedly bound by the original judgment had not
received notice of those proceedings 4 7 although they probably
were aware of them. 48 Some commentators have argued that the
real basis of the Court's decision was this lack of notice, 49 but the
position can hardly be supported. 50 The Court did not even
mention the absence of notice in its consideration of the protection due absentee interests. 51 Instead, the Hansberry Court emphasized lack of adequate representation as the basis of its decision.
representative's interests are typical of those of the class but adverse to those of a minority segment of the class. This is the Four Seasons-type situation. Such representatives
would meet (a)(3) but might not meet (a)(4). In such a case the court should order the
creation of subclasses (with different representatives) having common claims against the
opposing party but potentially conflicting interests among themselves. A court's failure to
divide the class increases the likelihood of later allegations of inadequate representation.
46 The constitutional requirement of adequate representation was recognized in
Hansberry and, since 1966, has been embodied in the rule. Nowhere is the source of the
constitutional requirement identified, except by citing Hansbeiry. By looking behind the
case to the rationale of the decision one can begin to identify due process notions of
jurisdiction as the source of the requirement. Adequate representation is probably a
requirement of due process in the sense of fundamental fairness as well, cf. text accompanying note 31 supra, but it may ultimately stem more specifically from a court's lack of
personal jurisdiction over absentees, if and when their interests differ radically from
those of the representative. If the interests of class and class representative are adverse, a
court's allowing the suit to proceed as a class action may violate the directive in subdivision (b)(3) that common questions predominate over questions affecting individual
members.
17372 Ill. at 377, 24 N.E.2d at 41 (Shaw & Murphy, JJ., dissenting); see Keeffe, Levy
& Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 CORN. L.Q. 327, 339 (1948).
48 One of the defendants in Hansbery, was the spouse of one of the plaintiffs in Burke,
372 11. at 372, 24 N.E.2d at 39.
49 E.g., Keeffe, Levy & Donovan, supra note 47, at 338-39. For further discussion of
the notice requirement, see text accompanying notes 53-72 infra.
50 The statements quoted fr'om Hansbery in the Keeffe article, supra note 47, say
nothing about notice; they only say that something must be done in the original suit to
ensure protection of absentee interests. This assertion provides no help in answering the
question whether either notice or adequate representation alone may satisfy due process
requirements for class suits or whether both are required.
. Comment, Adequate Representation, Notice and the New Class Action Rule: Effectuating
Renedies Provided by the Securities Laws, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 889, 910 (1968).
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Nevertheless Hansberry provides only oblique guidance for
cases under amended rule 23(b)(3) in which notice has been
provided. 52 Absentees who receive notice of proceedings have
already been afforded more protection than absentees without
notice. The Hansbery policy that due process requires protection
of absentees still stands; but it is not clear whether adequate
representation is an absolute requirement or whether receipt of
notice weakens the Hansberry rule. That case clearly established
adequate representation as an element of due process; but the
amendment of rule 23 to require notice to (b)(3) absentees
makes Hansberry less weighty authority.
B.

Notice

1. Hansberry and Mullane
Individual notice to class members identifiable "through
reasonable effort" is required by rule 23 only in (b)(3) suits, 53
cases in which the interests of the absentees may differ substantially from those of the class representative. The Advisory
Committee's Note explains that this "mandatory notice pursuant
to subdivision (c)(2), together with any discretionary notice which
the court may find it advisable to give under subdivision (d)(2), is
designed to fulfill requirements of due process to which the class
action procedure is of course subject. '5 4 The Advisory Committee cites, as authority for the due process requirements,
Hansberry and Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 5 5
presumably representing the leading cases on the respective requirements of adequate representation and notice.
Mullane held that "[a]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections. '5 6 With this declaration in mind, the draftsmen of
52 In the Four Seasons litigation Ohio argued that the notice it received was inadequate, but the district court rejected the argument. In its motion for relief from judgment Ohio argued that the court had "telescoped" its sending of notice of the pendency
of the suit and its notice of the settlement order. Post-Hearing Reply Brief for the State
of Ohio at 20, M.D.L. 55, 59 F.R.D. 667 (W.D. Okla. 1973) (Opinion No. 4).
53 FEn. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
51 Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 107 (1966).
55339 U.S. 306 (1950).
56 Id. at 314. The Court in Mullane invalidated a New York banking law that permitted judicial settlement of accounts without providing individual notice to known

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 123:1217

amended rule 23 tried to avoid constitutional problems by requiring that "the best notice practicable under the circumstances" be provided in (b)(3) suits. 5 7 The Advisory Committee
thought special notice was warranted in (b)(3) actions because of
the likelihood that (b)(3) individuals, because of the potential
diversity of interests, would rather prosecute58their own litigation
than be represented as a member of a class.
Many commentators and courts have refused to accept the
view that due process requires individual notice to absentees in a
class action, insisting that the Advisory Committee itself was
wrong if it thought that the Constitution required mandatory
individual notice in (b)(3) actions. 59 Mullane itself does not compel or even imply the conclusion that notice must be provided to
individual absentees. One commentator argues persuasively that
the Advisory Committee was "clearly misguided" in interpreting
Mullane to require individual notice to absent members of a class.
The entire rationale of the opinion rests on notifying
some of the interested parties with a minimum of expense and effort; due process was satisfied even though
all of the unknown beneficiaries would not receive
notice through the mail. The individual interests of the
income beneficiaries ... and the principal beneficiaries
. . . were identical to those of other beneficiaries of the
same type.
. . . If anything, the discussion of unknown and
conjectural beneficiaries seems to support the opposite
conclusion-absentees can be bound without any notice
if their interests are adequately represented.60
beneficiaries of the trusts involved. Notice by publication to unknown or unlocated
beneficiaries was approved.
57 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
58 Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 104-05 (1966).

59 See, e.g., Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 497-98 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other
grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1971) (too much emphasis on providing notice defeats the
purpose of the class action device); Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 292 F. Supp.
619 (D. Kan. 1968), aff'd on other grounds and remanded, 441 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1971),
23.55, at 1157-58; C.
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 951 (1972); 3B J. MooRE, supra note 24,
WRIGHT, supra note 3, at 313.
60 Comment, supra note 51, at 914 (footnotes omitted); Note, Managing the Large
Class Action: Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 87 HARV. L. REv. 426, 434 (1973): "Indeed, the
entire thrust of the case was that the amount of notice that would be required must be
determined by balancing the interests of the state in bringing any issues to a final settlement and the interests of those involved in the action in receiving notice."
In other words, absent class members seem to be in the same position as unknown or
conjectural beneficiaries in the Mullane situation, perhaps because it is not always clear
exactly who the members of a given class are. But see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417
U.S. 156 (1974). See also notes 64-72 infra & accompanying text.
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Still, the requirement of notice retains significance in class
actions as a means of ensuring adequate representation. According to Hansberry, due process is denied in class suits "only in
those cases where it cannot be said that the procedure adopted,
fairly insures the protection of the interests of absent parties who
'6 1 A Comment
are to be bound by it."
written shortly after adop-

tion of the 1966 amendments to the Rules argued that
it would seem a safe inference [from Hansberry] ...that

the Court, consistent with due process, might sanction a
rule which did not include any notice requirement, as
long as it is guaranteed that the
interests of the absentees
62
were adequately represented.
The stumbling block of this thesis is the word "guaranteed." No
procedural rule can assure that due process will result in every
case. The impossibility of guaranteeing adequate representation
requires that notice be provided, so that persons wishing to control their own litigation can exclude themselves from the class
and persons who want to remain in the class may appear and
take part in the suit.
The notice requirement provides an additional safeguard;
its purpose is to buttress the requirement of adequate
representation. 63 It is important to note that under this formulation the notice requirement flows not from Mullane, but from
the adequate representation requirement of Hansberry and its
incorporation in rule 23(a)(4).
2. Eisen
The recent case of Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin64 has been

cited as authority for the proposition that notice is more important than adequate representation in class actions under subdivision (b)(3).65 In Eisen, the Supreme Court endorsed a decision of
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit requiring that individual notice be sent to all known and identifiable class members
as a prerequisite to the maintenance of a (b)(3) class action.66
61

311 U.S. at 42.

62

Comment, supra note 51, at 911 (emphasis supplied).

63 See text accompanying notes 100-04 infra.

64 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
65 Cf.In re Four Seasons Securities Laws Litigation, 502 F.2d 834, 843 n.ll (10th

Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 516 (1974).
66 417 U.S. at 177. The Second Circuit had addressed itself in dictum at an earlier
stage of the litigation to the question of notice to absentees in (b)(1) and (b)(2) suits,
concluding that "notice is required as a matter of due process in all representative
actions, and 23(c)(2) merely requires a particularized form of notice in 23(b)(3) actions."
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The Second Circuit's decision had been criticized vehemently by
courts and commentators prior to the Supreme Court's affirmance.67 Besides arguing that adequate representation
formed the crux of rule 23's adherence to due process standards, critics cited the text of the rule: it requires "the best notice
practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to
68
all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.
The dispute centered around the meaning of this language.
Although Eisen certainly establishes the importance of notice
in rule 23's scheme of protection of absentees, it does not say
that notice is more important than adequate representation or
that notice may substitute for adequate representation. The
Court in Eisen addressed itself to the question of notice only
because Eisen, the named plaintiff, argued that he need not
provide individual notice to all the members of the class because
he had assured the court that he would represent them fairly
and adequately. The Court rejected his theory, stating:
We think this view has little to commend it. To begin
with, Rule 23 speaks to notice as well as to adequacy of
representation and requires that both be provided.
Moreover, petitioner's argument proves too much, for it
quickly leads to the conclusion that no notice at all, pub391 F.2d 555, 564-65 (1968) (Eisen II). The court cited Mullane in support of this position. Although the court characterized its pronotncement as a holding, it is difficult to
see how it qualifies as such when Eisen was a (b)(3) action. Indeed, the court made this
statement in the course of saying that the case was a (b)(3) action regardless of Eisen's
attempts to bring the action tinder (b)(1) or (b)(2) to avoid the mandatory notice requirement of rule 23(c)(2).
67 See, e.g., Note, supra note 60; Recent Developments, Eisen III: Fluid Recovery, Constructive Notice and Payment of Notice Costs by Defendant in ClassAction Rejected, 73 COLUm. L.
REV. 1641 (1973); Note, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin-Fluid Recovery, Minihearingsand
Notice in ClassActions, 54 B.U.L. REV. 111 (1974). See also Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D.
472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1971); Northern
Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 292 F. Supp. 619 (D. Kan. 1968), aff'd on other grounds and
remanded, 441 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 951 (1972).
That the Eisen III decision was an attempt to circumscribe use of the class action
device is apparent from the court of appeals' own statements. Believing that the problem
of large injuries to society and to the public is a problem for Congress, the court expressed its view that Congress should "create some public body to do justice in the matter
of consumers' claims in such fashion as to afford compensation to the injured consumer."
479 F.2d at 1019.
The Supreme Court could have reached the same result in Eisen III by refusing to
allow the suit to proceed, on the ground that the "difficulties likely to be encountered in
the management" of the suit, FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D), were too great, considering that
Eisen sought to represent 3,750,000 purchasers of odd lots on the New York Stock
Exchange. It is unfortunate that the Court used the notice requirement to achieve its
desired result, causing unnecessary confision of the theoretical issues.
IsFED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) (emphasis supplied).
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lished or otherwise, would be required in the present
case. This cannot be so, for quite apart from what due
process may require, the command of Rule 23 is clearly
to the contrary. 6 9
If the Court emphasized notice and understated adequacy of
representation, it was only because the representative plaintiff
eagerly assumed the latter burden but tried to avoid the former.
Obviously the holding in Eisen lays to rest, for the time
being, the argument that rule 23 does not require individual
notice in (b)(3) class actions. 70 But Eisen does not lead to the
conclusion that notice is a sufficient condition for holding a class
action judgment binding on absentees. The Eisen Court held that
both notice and adequate representation are required. 7 1 The
Court has not yet decided the question whether provision of
notice in a (b)(3) suit abrogates the requirement of adequate
representation.7

2

C. The Relationship Between Adequate Representationand Notice
The interplay between the two protections of rule 23 may
best be summarized as follows: adequate representation, as a
remedy, may serve as a substitute for notice, but receipt of
notice, as a precautionary measure, may not substitute for adequate representation. Nothing in the rule or the Constitution
69 417 U.S. at 176-77. But see text accompanying note 62 supra.
70

Eisen decided only that a class action could not be maintained without the provision of individual notice to all identifiable absentees. It did not reach the question
whether a judgment would be binding on absentees who had not received notice but who
had in fact been adequately represented. This distinction does not suffer from the logical
flaw previously mentioned, supra note 28, because a court could find, after judgment,
that an absentee had not received notice but had suffered no harm because of the quality
of the representation. If notice is an additional safeguard, as this Comment argues, its
absence should not matter in a case in which, because of adequate representation, the
additional safeguard was unnecessary.
71 See text accompanying note 69 supra. Although the Court speaks of the requirements of the rule-a factor noted by the court in FourSeasons to support its holding that
the Constitution does not require a showing that the representation has been adequate,
502 F.2d 834, 841 n.11 (10th Cir. 1974)-the Advisory Committee specifically noted that
it amended the rule with due process considerations in mind so that judgments in (b)(3)
suits could be held binding on absentees. Text accompanying note 54 supra.
72 The question here is not whether a court may from the outset let notice substitute
for adequate representation and permit an action to proceed as a class action knowing
that notice but not adequate representation will be provided. The draftsmen of the rule
clearly intended that the court be convinced that the class representative would be able
to, and would in fact, provide both. The question here is whether a judgment already
rendered, probably after lengthy proceedings or settlement negotiations, can be held
binding on absentees who admittedly received notice but allege that the representative's
handling of the suit was inadequate.

1234
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requires that there be mutuality, or perfect reciprocity, between
the two requirements, and it is the thesis of this Comment that
receipt of notice cannot nullify the requirement of adequate representation.
The two requirements are somehow related, but they cannot
substitute for each other in any sort of mathematical or automatic way. When representation has been adequate, it will not
matter in most cases that absentees were not notified of the suit.
This clearly is true in actions in which the rule does not require
the provision of notice, and it should be true even in (b)(3)
actions.7 3 If either requirement is primary, it is that of adequate
representation. If the requirements are equally weighty in principle, the purpose served by the notice requirement can be fulfilled by adequate representation, but not vice versa.
1. Adequate Representation as a Remedy for Lack of Notice
In deciding whether absentees will be bound by a judgment
when they received less than traditional notice or no notice at all,
a court should consider the quality of representation by the
named party.7 4 "In the degree that there is cohesiveness or unity
in the class and the representation is effective, the need for
notice to the class will tend toward a minimum. ''7 5 This is why
individual notice has not been considered constitutionally
necessary 76 and is not required by the rule in (b)(1) and (b)(2)
actions.7 7 In those actions, the requirements of adequate representation has been recognized as sufficient protection to absentees. The requirement is more easily fulfilled by the class representative in cases under (b)(1) and (b)(2) than in (b)(3) cases
because the interests of all class members in the former cases will
78
usually be identical.
In actions arising under subdivision (b)(3), it is harder for
the representative to protect the interests of every member of
the class. It would be wrong to conclude, however, that this
79
difficulty, combined with the requirement of individual notice,
makes adequate representation unimportant in subdivision (b)(3)
13 See
71

note 70 supra.
Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 45

(1967).
3B J. MooRE, supra note 24, 23.01[12.-2], at 23-35 & 36.
see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 564-65 (2d Cir. 1968) (Eisen II).
77See 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1786, at 144
(1972) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER].
78 Id.
79 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973) (Eisen III), vacated and
remanded, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). See generally text accompanying notes 64-72 supra.
7-

76But
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actions. The provision for notice in 23(c)(2) is intended to close
the adequacy-of-representation gap that otherwise exists between (b)(1) and (b)(2) actions on the one hand, and (b)(3) actions on the other. Diluting the adequate representation requirement because the notice requirement exists would put the
cart before the horse, and, at the same time, would undermine
the rule's protective scheme.
2. Notice as a Substitute for Adequate Representation
An allegation of inadequate representation will not necessarily be overcome by the defense that absentees received adequate
notice. The policies of Hansberry and Mullane provide some
guidance here:
Justice Stone's discussion in Hansbery intertwines fairness or adequacy of representation of the class with
other procedural safeguards. It was plausible to suppose that where claimed inadequacy of representation
was the nub of a collateral attack on a class judgment,
the question whether members had been informed of
the action and thereby had a chance to object to the
representation would be distinctly relevant. Informal
notice might be thought owing to class members as a
matter of "common decency" quite apart from any constitutional necessity. But further, at least where the
homegeneity or "solidarity" of the class was open to
some question, notice could bear directly on a court's
authority to render a judgment with full binding effect
80
on the class.
This does not mean that notice by itself can confer authority on
a court to render a binding judgment; it only suggests that
notice, as one of several "other procedural safeguards," contributes to a court's authority. The draftsmen of the amended
version of rule 23 adopted this position, agreeing that notice to
absentees increases the likelihood that a judgment will satisfy
due process requirements.
The traditional explanation of the importance of notice is
inapposite in the context of class actions. Mullane's notice requirement grew out of the Court's recognition that
"[t]he fundamental requisite of due process of law is the
opportunity to be heard.".. . This right to be heard has
80 Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 379-80 (1967).
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little reality or worth unless one is informed that the
matter is pending and can choose for himself whether
to appear or default, acquiesce or contest. 8 1
Unlike the defendant who receives notice in the standard suit,
the recipient of notice in a class action is often a potential plaintiff; he is not being offered the usual invitation to defend himself against claims of an adverse party. Someone, the class representative, has already chosen to appear; even a (b)(3) absentee
can do no more than put in his own appearance, acquiesce in
representation by the named party, object to that representation,
or exclude himself from the class.
Substantial impediments stand in the way of an absentee's
opting out. If he opts out and has claims similar to those of the
class, he probably cannot, in a suit of his own, benefit from the
class' victory through use of collateral estoppel; this would offend the courts as a form of one-way intervention.8 2 Any absentee not clearly outside the class is strongly constrained to accept
representation by the stranger who has chosen to bring suit.
These factors aggravate the basic deterrent to opting out, lack of
resources to prosecute one's own litigation. Even if an absentee
in a (b)(3) action remains in the class, he may not have the time,
money, or expertise to do anything but acquiesce in representation by the named party. 83 His opportunity to be heard is neces84
sarily only an opportunity to be heard through someone else.
Adequate representation remains crucial.
If the theory were that absentees actually choose to be represented by someone else and consent to that representation,
perhaps the adequate representation requirement could be overcome by providing notice of the right to request exclusion. This
hypothesis is supported by the observation that, when the old
"spurious" class action was considered no more than a permissive
joinder device, courts did not scrutinize the quality of
representation.8 5 Those who joined such an action were deemed
81

82

339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (citation omitted).
See notes 116-18 infra & accompanying text.

"See generally Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30, 33 (3d Cir.
1971).
14 It may be objected that an absent class member is no worse off than a party in
an
ordinary suit who is bound even though his attorney has made mistakes in the course of
the proceedings. See Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962). "What distinguishes absent class members is the difficulty in showing any agency relationship between

them and the named representative." Note, supra note 30, at 594 n.37.
85 3B J. MOORE, supra note 24,
23.07 [1] (citing, inter alia, York v. Guaranty Truit
Co., 143 F.2d 503, 528-29 (2d Cir. 1944), rev'd on other grounds, 326 U.S. 99 (1945)). But
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to have approved the named party's representation of their interests by their affirmative act of joining the suit. An agency
relationship could justifiably be inferred. But this cannot be said
of today's absentee, even in a (b)(3) action where he has received
notice of the action and of his right to opt out. He may fail to
exclude himself for a number of reasons, including inertia, ignorance, misunderstanding, and inaccurate assessment of the
representative's intentions or ability to protect the interests of
the absentees.
a. The Effect of Failingto Request Exclusion
It is really the opt-out provision in (b)(3) actions, rather than
notice per se, that provides any support for binding an absentee
by the judgment in a suit in which he was not adequately represented. If courts were to accept the Eisen II position 86 that
individual notice is constitutionally compelled in (b)(1) and (b)(2)
actions, it is highly unlikely that they would consider themselves
relieved of the duty to scrutinize the quality of representation in
those types of suits. If the judgments in such suits are to be
binding on the entire class, receipt of notice could not possibly
be thought to do away with the constitutional necessity of adequate representation. Absent members of (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes
may now receive discretionary notice of the pendency of the suit;
and the court must direct notice to them if the suit is to be
dismissed or compromised. 87 Yet the requirement of adequate
representation is not abandoned in suits in which notice has
issued pursuant to those subdivisions of rule 23.88
It is only because an absentee may opt out of a (b)(3) class
upon receipt of notice under (c)(2) that a court like the Four
see Rank v. (Krug) United States, 142 F. Supp. I (S.D. Cal. 1956), in which the court said
in dictum that adequate representation is required even in a spurious class action.
Otherwise, there would be nothing gained by use of rule 23 that could not be had
through rule 20 permissive joinder. Anticipating the 1966 amendment of the rule, the,
court reasoned:
Either Rule 23 is inconsistent within itself by calling for adequacy of representation and yet permitting a suit thereunder which does not culminate in a binding
decree despite satisfaction of due process, or the Rule is consistent and permits
as class suits only those in which the decree will bind absent parties virtually
present.
Id. at 154 n.93. The court wanted representatives to owe a duty of adequate representation even to absentees who took the affirmative action of intervening under the old
rule.
86

See note 66 supra.

87 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2), (e).
" Compare Research Corp. v. Asgrow Seed Co., 425 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970), with
Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1971).
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Seasons court could conclude than an inadequately represented
absentee should be bound. He is bound not because he has received notice of the action but because, according to this theory,
he has chosen to endorse the representative as his agent and to
approve the representation in advance. He must abide whatever kind and quality of representation he gets. The theory is
one of waiver or estoppel.
Because the opt-out provision is the peg upon which binding judgments are to hang, it is necessary to determine what
effect failure to opt out was intended to have, and why. The
draftsmen's reasons for including the provision are relevant.
The rule states in no uncertain terms that "the judgment,
whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not
request exclusion. '8 9 The opt-out provision is a means of allowing "individual preference . . . to operate," 90 even when the
court has determined that the suit may be maintained as a class
action: allowing prospective members to remove themselves
from the class honors "the interest of members of the class in
individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions." 9 1 Subdivision (c)(2) grants special rights to (b)(3) class
members, "concomitant to the extension of the binding effect of
92
common-question class judgments."
The binding effect of a judgment in a (b)(3) suit, however,
extends no farther than the judgments in (b)(1) and (b)(2) actions. It seems fair to say that an absentee's failure to request
exclusion may show nothing more than that he did not have a
strong interest in controlling his own litigation or that it appeared to him at the inception of the suit that his interests were
coextensive with those of the representative (assuming that an
absentee even knows what each of those interests is, and that he
understands the workings of the class action device and the
requisites of adequate representation). 93 It could be that an
absentee's acquiescence in representation by the named party
proves no more, even barring ignorance, inertia, etc., than that
the absentee agreed with the court that the suit has met the
89FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). But cf. notes 128-32 infra & accompanying text.
"' Kaplan, supra note 80, at 391.
91Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A)).
92 3B J. MOORE, supra note 24,
23.45[1], at 705 n.21.
93 This set of circumstances is unlikely, considering that the courts themselves are
struggling with the concept. After sending out notice of the antibiotics class action, the
Attorney General of North Carolina received, among others, the following letter: "Dear
Sir: I received your pamphlet on drugs, which I think will be of great value to me in the
future. I am unable to attend your class, however." Miller, Problems of Giving Notice in
Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 313, 321-22.
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requirements of subdivision (b)(3) of the rule. He may not have
given any thought to the requirements of subdivision (a).
The reasons for providing the (b)(3) absentee with notice
and an opportunity to exclude himself argue against treating
him differently from (b)(1) and (b)(2) absentees. The former
decide for themselves whether their positions are such that they
want nothing to do with the class, while the latter have already
been declared by the rule, as a matter of law, to have the same
interests as the representative. 9 4 Once the deadline for exclusion
in a (b)(3) action passes, the (b)(3) absentee is in the same position as absentees in other types of class actions. The (b)(3) absentee should have no more of an obligation "to monitor that litigation to make certain that his interests are being protected" 95 than
the (b)(1) or (b)(2) absentee. To do so would be to transform into
a disadvantage or form of punishment what was intended as
protection of absentees in the category of class actions most open
to abuse. 9 6 Unless the theory of the rule is that the chance to opt
out shifts from the trial court to the absentees the burden of
detecting potentially inadequate representation and of determin97
ing that the suit is not appropriate for class action treatment,
absentees with notice who have not opted out should not necessarily be bound.
b.

The Role of the Trial Court
Shifting the burden of evaluating the ability of the representative to protect the interests of the class from the court to the
94 By definition, the class in a (b)(1) or (b)(2) action comprises all those who will

share in or be directly affected by the grant or denial of relief [regardless of
whether they are technically included in the class]. Subdivision (b)(3), on the
other hand, looks to the existence of a group defined by the dependence of the
individual members on the determination of common issues; any relief ultimately granted may vary among the class members.
3B J. MooRE, supra note 24, 23.45[1], at 703. "[I]n most (b)(1) cases, the action will
automatically be characterized by a predominance of common questions and superiority
of class treatment." Id. 707 n.37. See also Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 259 F. Supp. 125
(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
95Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 76 (5th Cir. 1973).
96 As several courts have noted, the critical problem raising due process concerns in actions tinder subdivision (b)(3) is not simply notice of the institution of
the action, but whether the absent members actually are adequately represented.
Effective representation is especially important in Rule 23(b)(3) actions because
the class members are only loosely associated by common questions of law or
fact, rather than by any pre-existing or continuing legal relationship.
7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 77, § 1786, at 143, & cases cited therein.
97 For instance, the absentees would have to bring to the attention of the trial court
that the class should be divided into subclasses. The rule places the duty of making this
determination on the court. Cf. note 45 supra. See generally 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra

note 77, at § 1790.
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absentees does violence to one of the central policies of rule 23.
Active court supervision of the class action suit has been cited by
many courts and commentators as central to the functioning of
the class action device. 98 One commentator has said of the
judge's discretionary powers:
It is clear that this authority is the key to the philosophy
behind the new rule. The judge is no longer a passive
observer, allowing the initiative of the opposing attorneys to control the course of the litigation; he plays an
active role. In a very real sense, he is the guardian of
the interests of the absentees. Only through his constant
vigilance and sense of fairness will the radically altered
Rule 23 achieve its full potential. 9 9
The court should not be relieved of its duty to protect absentees
by saying that absentees who were not adequately represented
should have protected themselves by requesting exclusion. The
interests of absentees who remain in the class must still be
safeguarded by the court.
3. Summary: Notice as Part of Adequate Representation
Notice should be viewed as a part of, or handmaiden to,
adequate representation. The notice requirement reinforces the
requirement of adequate representation.10 0 This proposition,
central to the argument of this Comment, has been misunderstood or ignored by courts and commentators who insist on the
primary and paramount importance of notice. '10 "Important as
notice may be, coupled as it is with traditional notions of fair
9

See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 74.
99Comment, supra note 51, at 898. The judge "must not only make the initial decision on maintenance of a class action and constantly ensure that the decision was correct
[FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)], and that the absentees' interests are being preserved; he must
also approve any final settlement of a case which has been maintained as a class action."
Id. Judge Weinstein of the Southern District of New York has noted that when
the court becomes convinced during the course of litigation that representation
is inadequate it should'have power to eliminate the representative character of a
case on its own motion, because a defendant, preferring the possible resjudicata
benefits of a class action, might find it against his interest to make the motion.
Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9

BUFFALO

L. REV. 433,

461-62 (1960). It should be noted that Judge Weinstein was talking about New York's
class action rule, but the policy considerations are the same for the Federal Rules.
100 See text accompanying note 63 supra.
101 See, e.g., Maraist & Sharp, FederalProcedure'sTroubled Marriage:Due Process and the

Class Action, 49 TEXAs L. REV. 1 (1970). "The amended rule provides that in all class
actions, regardless of whether actual notice is given, representation must be adequate.
Thus the rtle goes beyond the requirements of due process, for if actual notice is given,
the adequacy of the representation is immaterial." Id. 15-16.
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play in the constitutional sense, it is still
only one of the facets of
02
representation."'
adequate
and
fair
Notice allows absentees to exclude themselves; but if they do
not, the court must carry the burden of ensuring that remaining
absentees are protected. That some absentees choose to exclude
themselves from the class should not prejudice the rights of
those who remain. The latter should not be regarded differently,
for purposes of determining whether due process has been satisfied, than members of (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes. In those cases no
notice is provided to absentees at all, and yet the presence of
adequate representation is enough to satisfy the demands of due
process. Eisen H would not change this by its suggestion that
notice is a constitutional requirement in (b)(1) and (b)(2) actions
as well. Recognition of such a constitutional command would
strengthen the procedural requirements provided by the rule to
ensure adequate representation.' 0 3
An assumption that the strengthening of one requirement
diminishes the importance or necessity of the other requirement
is unsound. If notice and adequate representation are viewed as
distinct and independent requirements, it does not follow that
either could substitute for the other. 10 4 If the argument of this
Comment is accepted, that notice is part of adequate representation, then strengthening the notice requirement would fortify
the requirement of adequate representation as well.
III.

COMPETING INTERESTS

The case for not binding absentees if they have received
notice but have not been adequately represented has been stated
in the preceding section of this Comment. The policy of the rule
and the rule's stated purpose of satisfying due process considerations reinforce each other and suggest that such absentees
should be relieved of the effect of judgment. Nevertheless, there
are competing interests which might lead a court to conclude
that such absentees should be bound. An inquiry into the merits
"02 Degnan,

Foreword: Adequacy of Representation in Class Actions, 60

CAL L. REv. 705,
718 (1972).
103 Rule 23(d) allows the court to order notice to absent members of a class in an
action maintained under subdivisions (b)(1) and (b)(2) as a matter of discretion. "Even if
an absolute notice requirement does not apply to all class actions, it should be kept in
mind that notice does help the court in assuring that there is adequate representation of
the class." 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, Supra note 77, § 1793, at 205. Requiring such notice in
(b)(1) and (b)(2) actions would serve the same purpose.
104 It may even follow that neither can substitute for the other, an unusual conclusion from the premise. The premise must be that the requirements are alternative, not
independent.
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of binding an absentee could be "guided by the purpose of the
rule to prevent one-way intervention, the interests in the finality
of judgments, and related case law precedent.' 10 5 The Four
Seasons court cited these interests in support of its decision that it
need not consider the question of adequate representation.
Each of these admittedly legitimate interests warrants consideration, but whether taken separately or cumulatively, they do
not outweigh the policy considerations and constitutional requirements that call for relief from judgment. To some extent,
they even support the argument for relief from judgment.
A.

One-Way Intervention
The court of appeals in Four Seasons warned of a return to
"one-way intervention" and based its decision partly on a desire
to avoid that result. The desire is legitimate: one of the reasons
for abandoning the spurious class action and designing the (b)(3)
action to include absentees who did not opt out was prevention
of one-way intervention. That practice allowed a person to claim
"the benefits of a favorable judgment to which he was not a
named party," even though "he would not have been bound by
an unfavorable judgment rendered against named parties who
did not adequately represent his interests."'10 6 The result was a
system in which "conjectural"' 0 7 class members could stand by
the wayside during a suit, ready to intervene if the "class" representative won, or to bring separate suits on their own if the
representative lost. The practice was unfair to the party opposing the class, because it subjected him to the possibility of an
unlimited number of lawsuits and denied him the security of a
judgment binding all potential litigants of the particular cause of
action.
Courts that allowed one-way intervention under the original
rule reasoned that disallowing it would reduce the rule to a
permissive joinder device. 10 8 If being a member of a class meant
only that one could intervene in a suit while it was in progress,
the courts reasoned, class membership was worthless. Any individual with interests related to a cause of action could intervene
under rule 20 anyway.' 0 9 Instead of seeking to correct the rule
the courts labored to invent a procedure they felt was consistent
105 502 F.2d at 843.
"'"
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 589 (10th Cir. 1961)
(allowing one-way inter\ ention).
l7.note 62 supra.
"'s 300 F.2d at 589. See generally text accompanying notes 15-19 supra.
""'t But see note 15 supia.

1975]

DUE PROCESS IN CLASS ACTIONS

with its purpose. What they created turned out to be more inequitable than what they were trying to avoid, and total revision
of the rule became necessary.
No one can disparage the revised version of rule 23 as a
mere permissive joinder device. It provides for inclusion in the
judgment of all members of the described class who have not
requested exclusion. The position taken by the FourSeasons court
is that allowing post-judgment opting-out, via rule 60(b) relief
from judgment or via collateral attack, gives absentees the same
advantage as that formerly enjoyed by sideline-sitters who could
intervene after the judgment. As one court has put it, "The
difference between 'I will intervene if our side has already won'
and 'If I find out our side has lost I will collaterally attack the
judgment on due process grounds' may not be very great."' 1 0
Courts should be wary of artful ways of unfairly exploiting the
class action procedure, but apprehension of a return to one-way
intervention through use of rule 60 or collateral attack is unwarranted.
First, use of the term "one-way intervention" in the context
of direct or collateral attack on a judgment is incorrect. Absentees seeking relief from judgment want out, not in. To some the
distinction may be no more apparent or persuasive than that
between conditions precedent and subsequent: with one-way intervention, the absentee waits for judgment and then joins the
class; with relief from judgment, the absentee takes his chances
with the class from the outset (simply by not requesting exclusion) and acts only if his hopes of winning are not fulfilled. The
distinction lies in taking action before or after judgment.
But the practices differ. There is little incentive for an absent member of a class that has lost its suit to seek relief from
judgment: obtaining relief gives the absentee no more than the
right to relitigate. An absentee will seek relief from judgment
only if he believes that he has been inadequately represented or
that he has claims different from those of the class and its representative. Only in these cases will an absentee have any better
110Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 459 (E.D. Pa.
1968) (dictum). It should be noted that this comment was made in the context of urging
courts to keep the scope of rule 23 reasonably narrow. The collateral attacks anticipated
by Judge Fullam were attacks on judgments purporting to bind absentees who had not
received notice, not absentees who complained about the representation. This concern
merits more weight than the fear that absentees whose class has lost will raise the issue of
inadequate representation. First, inadequate representation is iharder to prove. Second,
the insecurity of the opposing party is greater when he thinks he is concluding litigation
on a cause of action with a large class, only to find later that half the class received no
notice and remain free to press their claims against him.
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chances of success on his own than had the losing class
representative."' Obtaining relief from judgment only returns
the parties to the respective positions they enjoyed before the
class action was brought; it does not give the absentee benefits
12
that accrue to a party intervening after a favorable judgment.1
Second, relief from judgment is not automatic as was oneway intervention and as is the option to exclude oneself from the
class during the suit. An absent party dissatisfied with the
judgment" 3 cannot simply elect to be excluded from the class
after judgment as it could have done prior to the deadline for
opting out. The party moving for relief from judgment, or defending against a claim of res judicata in a subsequent suit, must
prove that he was denied due process of law.1 4 The standard of
proof is high: "The [reviewing] court, of course, presumes that
the first action was conducted in accordance with due process
standards. The burden is upon the party asserting a contrary
position to raise the issue and to prove otherwise." 1 5 An absent
party cannot be relieved of a judgment solely because there was
error in the original suit; the remedy for error is appeal, not
motion for relief from judgment.
An absentee, after having requested exclusion, may not
benefit from a favorable judgment by arguing that the representation turned out to be unexpectedly good. This would be a true
return to one-way intervention. Neither can an absentee who has
excluded himself "invoke a judgment in favor of the class as
collateral estoppel in a jurisdiction that does not require mutual-6
ity as a condition on the application of collateral estoppel.""1
Rule 23 does not say whether such a practice would be permissible, but it seems clear that the purpose of amending the rule to
"1Of course the absentee might think he could do better than the class for reasons
unrelated to the merits of the case, such as choice of court or ability of counsel. But
without a meritorious claim differentiating him from the rest of the class, such an absentee could not obtain relief from judgment. See text accompanying notes 113-15 infra.
112 This may not be true when the class is composed of defendants, but defendant
classes are tnusual; and most of this discussion assumes the more common class of
plaintiffs.
113 Dissatisfaction with the judgment is not confined to situations in which the class
has "lost." In the Four Seasons case, for example, the plaintiff class that included Ohio
negotiated a settlement agreement netting the class several million dollars. Ohio was
unsatisfied, however, with its share of the pie.
14 Or, in a motion for relief from judgment tinder a clause of rule 60 other than
(b)(4), the movant must prove whatever is required by that clause.
"1.5 Research Corp. v. Edward J. Funk & Sons Co., 15 F.R. Serv. 2d 580, 582 n.2
(N.D. Ind. 1971).
"1 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 77, § 1789, at 183; see Sarasota Oil Co. v.
Greyhound Leasing & Financial Corp., 483 F.2d 450, 452 (10th Cir. 1973); Kaplan, supra
note 80, at 391 n.136.
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preclude one-way intervention would prohibit such a practice."17
There is little practical difference between intervening postjudgment to benefit from a favorable judgment and bringing
suit on one's own, armed with the favorable judgment as collateral estoppel. Allowing an excluded absentee to use the judgment would "make a mockery of the notice and opting-out procedure in Rule 23(c)(2),"' 11 8 but permitting relief from judgment
does not so offend the rule. 19
Finally, another procedure, which resembles one-way intervention more closely than relief from judgment, has been permitted. In Schrader v. Selective Service System 2 0 the defendant
argued that an absent member of the plaintiff class could not
share in the judgment favorable to the class because he had not
received the required notice of the suit. The argument was
weak and the court rejected it:
A judgment in favor of the defendant against the class
may not be binding upon members of the class who
later sue the defendant and argue that they were not
adequately represented in the class action. But the
rationale for this view is that every man must be
guaranteed his day in court. This rationale has no application to the converse situation in which defendants
have had the opportunity fully to litigate the issues in a
21
previous case.'
The defendant should have argued, and perhaps meant to
argue, that although allowing this unnotified member of the
plaintiff class to benefit from the class judgment might not cause
any harm, its implications were dangerous. It amounted to a
resurrection of one-way intervention. A putative member of the
plaintiff class could demand relief if the judgment were favorable, but could bring his own suit following an unfavorable judgsupra note 77, § 1789, at 183.
1 Id.at 183-84.
119In fact, the inability of an excluded absentee to use a judgment favorable to the
class as collateral estoppel may accentuate the need for sensible use of the equitable
remedy of relief from judgment. An absentee deciding whether to opt out knows that he
cannot use collateral estoppel if the class wins. Yet he may be unable to prove the
necessary elements of his claim on his own. He may not know whether his interests
coincide with those of the representative, but he cannot afford to opt out and go it on his
own. Not only is he barred from using the class' favorable judgment, but the opposing
party probably could use an unfavorable judgment in defense to the absentee's claims, if
it turned out that the absentee's claims were like those of the class. Such a practice would
not constitute a form of one-way intervention.
120 329 F. Supp. 966 (W.D. Wis. 1971).
121 Id. at 967.
"17 7A WRIGHT & MILLER,
18
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ment, avoiding the binding effect of the earlier judgment 1by
22
showing that he never received the required individual notice.
Yet the Schrader court failed even to mention the specter of
one-way intervention. In contrast, allowing relief from judgment
on due process grounds presents little threat to the integrity or
equity of rule 23.
The court in Schrader probably rejected the defendant's argument against inclusion of absentees because it sounded specious and contrived. The notice requirement was meant to
safeguard the rights of absentees, not to reduce a defendant's
liability. The objection to letting a defendant argue against inclusion of absentees, 1 23 like the objection to one-way intervention, is
based on the theory, akin to that of unjust enrichment, that each
of these practices gives the party two "days in court." The defendant in such a situation has probably already argued against
maintenance of the suit as a class action and lost, just as the
one-way intervenor has already been apprised of the terms of
the judgment.
In a 60(b)(4) motion, on the other hand, an absentee can be
relieved of the effect of the judgment if and only if he proves
lack of due process. Even a named party to an individual suit,
who has been present in court, will be granted relief if he has
been denied due process. There is no more reason to bind an
absent class member who has been denied due process than to
bind a party in an ordinary action who has in fact had his day in
court but has been denied due process. The same principles
respecting the integrity and finality of judgments should apply.
B. Finality of Judgments
Finality of judgments is an important principle in American
jurisprudence. The deference accorded to final judgments
emerges from the clash of two respected principles: that litiga122 This is another reason for holding that lack of notice should not void a judgment
if the representation of the class has been adequate. In this hypothetical case, the benefit
of so holding would inure to the opposing party and would protect him against all future
litigation of the issue by new plaintiffs whose claims did not differ from those of the class.
Cf. note 110 supra.
123 But see School District v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 1001, 1005
(E.D. Pa. 1967), where the court objected to the inclusion of all absent members of a
described class, not because of considerations of due process to absentees, but because of
the potential unfairness to defendants who would be liable to many described plaintiffs
against whom they had had no discovery, cross-examination, etc. This concern may be
moot if the holding in Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999 (7th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 921 (1972), is followed. See text accompanying notes
140-42 infra.
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tion must terminate within a reasonable period of time and that
both parties must be treated justly. The principle of res judicata
attempts to honor the former interest, while the latter is served
by recognizing that "res judicata is not an inexorable command."' 2 4 Certain attacks on a judgment, as by motion for a new
trial, appeal, or collateral attack, are accepted means of challenging an otherwise "final" judgment. 2 5 The finality principle must
be recognized as a concept representing the reconciliation of
competing interests, rather than as an absolute command.
Finality of judgments is especially important in the class action context. The opposing party should be protected once and
for all from the multiple claims of the class members. The class
action, particularly under subdivision (b)(3), should "achieve
economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity
of decision as to persons similarly situated,' 2 6 goals equally
beneficial to the class and to the opposing party. Finality also
encourages settlement of class actions. A commentator has observed that
too liberal application of collateral review of class actions would discourage settlement of such actions
-- considered particularly important in complex, multiparty litigation . . .- since defendants will be loathe to
offer substantial sums in compromise unless they can
rely upon the judgment to bind all the class members
they and the court expect it to bind. 27
Finality of judgments is a more serious consideration than oneway intervention. The latter permits a class member to share in
the recovery when he would not have been bound by an unfavorable judgment; the former, however, prevents an absentee
from taking action after judgment that he clearly could have
taken before the deadline for opting out.
Yet it is clear that a judgment is res judicata only if it has
been rendered in accordance with due process. The Advisory
Committee noted this premise in its comment qualifying the
bold assertion that "one-way intervention is excluded; .
[and] the judgment, whether or not favorable, will include the
class .... ",128 The intent of the Committee is plain: no one is to
1246A J. MooRE, supra note 24,

60.02, at 4022.

125 Id.

126Advisor) Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 102-03 (1966).
127 Note, supra note 30, at 601.
128Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 106 (1966).
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be let in or out after judgment has been rendered. But there is a
caveat:
Although thus declaring that the judgment in a
class action includes the class, as defined, subdivision
(c)(3) does not disturb the recognized principle that the
court conducting the action cannot predetermine the res
judicata effect of the judgment;
this can be tested only in
1 29
a subsequent action.

Commentators have reiterated and emphasized this necessary
restriction on the otherwise broad scope of class action judgments. 130 Absent parties "have a clear right in some later litigation to attack the judgment which purports to bind them,"'13
and the quality of representation in the original suit has been
cited as the most important factor to be considered by a review2
3

ing court.1

Attacking a judgment on the ground of inadequate representation presents little threat to the finality of judgments.
Judgments obtained in violation of due process of law are void,
and "[b]y their nature void judgments have no legal binding
effect."' 3 3 Unlike the other clauses of rule 60, (b)(4) applies only
to void judgments, which "may be collaterally attacked, i.e.,
[their] nullity and ineffectiveness asserted at any time, in any
proceeding where the validity of the judgment comes in issue
and is appropriately challenged."'1

34

Attacking such a judgment

by a rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment presents a lesser
threat to the stability of judgments than would a collateral attack
on the judgment. A direct attack via 60(b)(4) is heard "within a
reasonable time" of the original judgment, in the same court,
and probably by the same judge who heard the original action. 3 5 As a general proposition, "[d]irect attacks on judgments
are greatly to be preferred to collateral attacks.'

3 6

Motions under rule 60(b) may pose a threat to the finality of
judgments, but no more than any of the other recognized inroads upon the principle of res judicata. The basic integrity of
the principle remains intact. If rule 60(b) "has struck a fair
129

Id.

,10 Frankel, supra note 74, at 46; C. WRIGHT, supra note 3, at 314; Kaplan, supra note
80, at 393; 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 77, § 1789, at 176.
'31 Frankel, supra note 74, at 46.
132 Id.
133
7 J. MooRE, supra note 24, 60.41[1], at 801.
134 Id. 802.
135 Note, supra note 30, at 598 n.55.
136 Weinstein, supra note 99, at 460.
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balance" 137 in general, there is no reason it may not be applied to
class actions.
C. Case Law Precedent
The precedent in this area of class action law is muddled.
Cases can be, and frequently are, cited for conflicting positions,
each sufficient to decide a particular case but none meeting
head-on the question whether notice can substitute for adequate
representation. The Four Seasons court, for example, relied on
several cases to show that its decision was "not the first time that
a class member with notice has been bound by a judgment after
failing to take some affirmative action."' 13 8 Although technically
correct, this declaration sheds no light on the problem under
supporting either
consideration, since contradictory statements
13 9
side of the issue appear in the cases.
17

7 J. MOORE,

supra note 24,

60.42, at 902.

138502 F.2d at 844. The court cited Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co.,
450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 921 (1972); Research Corp. v. Asgrow
Seed Co., 425 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970); Supermarkets General Corp. v. Grinnell Corp.,
59 F.R.D. 512 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 490 F.2d 1183 (2d Cir. 1974); Mungin v.Florida
East Coast Ry., 318 F. Supp. 720 (M.D. Fla.), aff'd, 441 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 897 (1971); School District v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 267 F.
Supp. 1001 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
Of these cases, only Brennan and Research Corp. are relevant. Mungin is inapplicable
to the Four Seasons situation, having involved no charges of inadequate representation. It
involved denial of relief under 60(b)(2) and (b)(6), primarily because an unreasonable
period of time had passed before the motions were made, and the movants had allowed
"intervening events to occur pursuant to the judgment which radically alter[ed] the
positions of the parties . . . . The movants, dissatisfied with settlement terms, had
already cashed the checks awarded to them from the settlement fund, and the court
treated this as ratification of the settlement. Yet the court remarked that an "offer to
restore the entire status quo ante [would] meet the terms which the Court is of the opinion
would be just for relief." 318 F. Supp. at 735. This illustrates how liberally a court may be
willing to construe rule 60(b). Cf.text accompanying note 137 supra.
The movants in Supermarkets General made no allegations of inadequate representation, and the closest they came to alleging a want of due process or noncompliance with
rule 23 was the argument, as an alternative to their primary reliance on excusable
neglect, that the notice provided was insufficient because it went to the wrong person.
In Harper & Row, the court would not even allow the suit to proceed as a class action.
The court's language that may have influenced the Four Seasons court was that where a
class member "simply ignores the notice, whether by intention or by inadvertance, it
becomes, by inaction alone, a member of the class to be bound by the judgment." 267 F.
Supp. at 1005, quoted in Brief for Appellant Jack L. Clark at 30, In re Four Seasons
Securities Laws Litigation, 502 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1974). Far from approving of this
result, the court protested against "[s]uch a radical extension by [sic] this Court's jurisdiction by the mere inaction of a non-appearing, non-resident citizen" which would be, in
the court's view, "unprecedented," 267 F. Supp. at 1005.
139 Ohio asserted: "No case has held that notice to absent members of a class is
sufficient to satisfy due process." Brief for Appellee at 43, In re Four Seasons Securities
Laws Litigation, 502 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1974). The FourSeasons defendants claimed that
the "wealth of judicial authority .. .and the absence of a single judicial decision to the
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Although the cases provide no clear answers, they do lend
some insight into the criteria and policy considerations relevant
to a resolution of the notice/adequate representation controversy. Far from supporting the view that receipt of notice is
sufficient to bind absentees, the relevant cases, on close analysis,
indicate that adequate representation must also be found.
1.

Requirement of Adequate Representation Implied

In Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance Co., 140 the

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit implied that a judgment would be void as to notified absentees if they had not been
adequately represented. The movants in Brennan alleged inadequate representation as an alternative to their primary allegation in support of a motion for relief from judgment under rules
60(b)(4) and (b)(6). The plaintiff class of which movants were
members had won a securities fraud suit maintained under
subdivision (b)(3), but movants were denied a share of the
recovery because they failed to respond to interrogatories
directed both to absent members of the class and to the class
representatives. The claims of the absentees were dismissed
with prejudice, as the notice provided pursuant to rule 23(c)(2)
had warned.'4' The reviewing court held that "absent members
of a class who receive notice of the pendency of the class suit
may be subjected to the party discovery procedures permitted
under the Federal Rules.' 4 2 Absentees were required to take
some affirmative action to benefit from the judgment.
contrary demonstrates that the court below applied the wrong legal standard" in considering Ohio's motion for relief from judgment. Brief for Appellant Jack L. Clark at 30, In
re Four Seasons Securities Laws Litigation, 502 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1974).
Both statements are technically accurate, because there has been no other case in
which a court has found a combination of inadequate representation and adequate
notice. No case has yet had to decide that notice was sufficient to satisfy due process.
Even the Supreme Court in Mullane only said that notice was "an elementary and fundamental requirement of due process," 339 U.S. at 314 (emphasis supplied). No case in
which absentees received notice has found absentees denied due process, because there
have always been other factors supporting the receipt of notice to allow the court to deem
the judgments binding. The statement of the FourSeasons defendants in support of their
assertion, that "those decisions which have refused to bind absent class members to the
judgment entered for or against the class have uniformly involved class members who received no notice of the action," Brief for Appellant Jack L. Clark at 30, In re Four
Seasons Securities Laws Litigation, 502 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1974), is misleading. The
absence of notice was rarely cited by the court rendering the decision as the reason for
denying binding effect. Hansbeny is a good example. See text accompanying note 47
supra.
140 450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 921 (1972).
141
Id. at 1001-02.
142 Id. at 1006.
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The movants raised the issue of adequate representation to
buttress their contention that they, as absentees, should not have
been required to respond to discovery orders. They argued in
the alternative that if such procedures were proper, the sanction
for failing to respond should have been only exclusion from the
class, not extinction of their claims against the defendant without
their sharing in the relief obtained by the class.
The allegation of inadequate representation was that counsel for the class representatives should have opposed the discovery orders or taken an appeal. The court disagreed:
Since we have considered movants' arguments on
their merits . . . and have concluded that the discovery
procedures were proper, this argument loses much of
its strength. But even if it could be said that counsel
should have opposed the requested discovery, that does
not imply that movants were inadequately represented.
Adequate representation does not demand absence of
1 43
error in judgment.
The court based its decision not on the fact that movants had
received "full notice of the proceedings,"'144 but rather on a finding that the representative's conduct of the action had been
adequate. 1 45 Another factor militated against granting relief: two
43

1

Id.

144Id.

The defendants in Four Seasons cited the following passage from the Brennan
opinion in support of their position:
Members of a class, having had full notice of the proceedings and the opportunity to seek the advice of a lawyer of their own choosing and not having availed
themselves of that opportunity, may not ignore the advice of qualified counsel
for the class and later complain about the advice given.
Reply Brief for Appellant Jack L. Clark at 10-11, In re Four Seasons Securities Laws
Litigation, 502 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1974). But this statement must be taken in context:
the court in Brennan found the representation adequate. See note 145 infra & accompanying text. In Brennan counsel for the class had advised the absentees to respond to the
discovery orders; the court characterized this advice as potentially erroneous when given
but ultimately sound, and in any case not so derelict as to constitute inadequate representation of the absentees.
145"At the time the suit was designated a class action, the district court determined
that the class members would be represented adequately by the named plaintiff and her
counsel. The successful prosecution of the action serves to confirm that determination."
450 F.2d at 1006. The representative plaintiffs prosecuted their action successfully in
Four Seasons, too, but the cases are distinguishable. The representatives in Brennan had
the same substantive interests as the rest of the class, but differed from the absentees on
the procedural matter of willingness to respond to discovery orders. The substance/
procedure dichotomy is a shaky one, but in this case it suffices to show that the
representative's interests in the outcome of the case were not adverse to those of the
absentees. In Four Seasons the interests of the representative in the substance of the
settlement were allegedly adverse to those of the absentee Ohio.
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and a half years had elapsed between the dismissal
of movants'
46
claims and the filing of their rule 60(b) motion.
The Brennan court expressly left open the question whether
a showing of inadequate representation would have rendered
the judgment void as to the absentees. The court began its inquiry by stating: "[I]f -we accept movants' contention that the
district judge erroneously assumed the power to direct interrogatories to 'absent' class members, it is at least arguable that
the dismissal of movants' claims is void."'1 47 The majority did not
specify whether voidness would be attributable to inadequate
48
representation or to misuse of rule 23(d) by the trial judge,
but the dissenting judge based his opinion on grounds of inadequate representation. He wrote:
The judgment purporting to dismiss their claims with
prejudice was predicated solely on a factor which differentiated them from the rest of the class .... In this
case movants' interest in avoiding the sanction of dismissal with prejudice ... was a matter of indifference to
the representative plaintiff. 49
It appears that this position is the more acceptable one. Regardless of which view was correct as to the factual adequacy or
inadequacy of representation in the suit under review in
Brennan, the court there seems in principle to have endorsed the
constitutional necessity of adequate representation above and
beyond receipt of notice.
Another recent case, Dierks v. Thompson,' 50 supports the position that only those absentees who have been adequately represented may constitutionally be bound by the class action judgment. There the court reviewed, among other things, the trial
court's decision to let a suit proceed as a class action. Former
employees of a corporation sued the corporation's trustees to
146 450 F.2d at 1003.
147 Id.
148 FED.

R. Civ. P. 23(d) provides in part: "In the conduct of actions to which this
rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders ... "
Other (b)(3) cases have sustained the power of the trial judge to give such additional
notice and to require that absent class members respond as a condition of recovery. See,
e.g., Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 459 (E.D. Pa.
1969); Harris v. Jones, 41 F.R.D. 70, 74-75 & nn.9 & 10 (D. Utah 1966). The position
presents problems: If known absentees who receive individual notice are required to take
affirmative action, they are discriminated against in relation to unknown absentees who
do not receive individual notice and cannot be expected to respond to notice by publication which they may never have seen.
148 450 F.2d at 1007.
1:-1414 F.2d 453 (lst Cir. 1969).
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determine the employees' rights under its profit-sharing plan
and trust fund.15 ' In considering whether the plaintiffs who
brought suit were "truly representational" of all the employees,
the court said:
Unless the relief sought by the particular plaintiffs who
bring the suit can be thought to be what would be desired by the other members of the class, it would be
inequitable to recognize plaintiffs as representative, and
a violation of due process to permit them to obtain a
1 52
judgment binding absent plaintiffs.
Although the court concluded that the representatives might
have represented only one of two groups of employees with
conflicting interests, it held that due process had been satisfied
because the defendants in the suit had
actively supported the position of this [hypothetical]
second group of former employees. Therefore, while it
is not true that plaintiffs, as they would claim, represent
all Amerotron employees, it is true that any whom they
do not represent are represented by the defendants.
Accordingly, we find the requirements of due process
to be satisfied.' 53
The court employed this novel reasoning to avoid the question whether "the court may describe [in its judgment] a class
that is limited to those who like the relief sought, after the others
have had an opportunity to opt out.' 5 4 In other words, can a
court redefine the class to be described in the judgment to include only those whose interests have been adequately represented by the named party? If it can, then a reviewing court
could also redefine the "class" to be included in the judgment
upon a showing that some members of the original "class" had
discovered that their interests were adverse to the representative's. The absentees' interests would have to be fundamentally different from those of the representative; mere differences
151
The reviewing court's opinion suggests that the suit was a (b)(3) action by its
mention of opting out and notice, id. at 456-57 & n.7, but nowhere is the subdivision
mentioned and the suit seems to fit more easily under (b)(1)(B), since interpretation of
the corporation's plan "would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the
other members not parties to the adjudications .... FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
152 414 F.2d at 456.
153Id. at 457.
154Id. at 456-57. This proposition will be considered here without reference to the
facts of Dierks, as it is not clear that Dierks was brought under subdivision (b)(3). Note 151
supra.
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in opinion as to how the claims were litigated or whether they
should have been litigated at all 155 would not warrant relief.
Under the second Dierks proposition-that a court may redefine the class to be bound by the judgment to include only
those in fact adequately represented during the litigation-a reviewing court might conclude not only that some absentees had
been denied adequate representation, but that they had not been
bona fide members of the class represented by the named party.
This analysis would make more sense than the glib resolution of
the problem embodied in the first proposition in Dierks, for it is
not clear, as a matter of constitutional law, that the Dierks absentees would have been accorded due process by the defendanttrustees' having argued for the absentees' position. The Dierks
court was not faced with an attack on the judgment by absentees;
if it had been, it probably would not have reached the conclusion
that due process was satisfied. The notion that absent members
of a plaintiff class can be represented by defendants is jarring
and illogical. The absentees could have argued for a third possible interpretation of the contract in question. Even if the defendant trustees had supported the exact position of the absentees,
they might have done so with less vigor than a representative of
the absentees would have employed, especially if the trustees
were supporting the second interpretation only to create a case
or controversy so that the court would hear the suit.
Finally, the Dierks scheme of permitting defendants to "represent" absentees cannot be justified in light of Hansberry, in
which both sides of the issue were also presented to the court.
The requirement of adequate representation as embodied in
amended rule 23 is based on the principle that the representa6
tion of persons, not positions, is what matters in a class suit. 5
The second proposition in Dierks is the better view, because it
follows the conjunction of criteria required by Hansberry and
elaborated upon in Part II of this Comment, that due process is
satisfied only when representatives and absentees are meinbers
of the same class and when the former adequately represent the
157
interests of the latter.
155

See generally Leisner %. New York Tel. Co., 358 F. Supp. 359, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).

5, See text accompanying note 12 supra.
157

The Dierk6 theory is supported by language in an older representative action

declaring that absentees who were not adequately represented could not be considered
members of the class that the named party purported to represent. In Weeks v. Bareco
Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1941), a sptrious class action tinder original rule 23, the

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit interpreted Hansbeny as having involied two
distinct classes. The court justified allowing such a suit to proceed, even though the
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2. The Right of Absentees to Appeal
A related issue in recent class action litigation is the question
whether absentees who have not appeared, objected to representation, or intervened as parties of record may appeal from an
order approving the terms of a settlement. 1 58 The courts have
not agreed on an answer, but their decisions may be relevant to
the propriety of granting relief from judgment on the basis of
inadequate representation.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to let
absentees take an appeal for the defendant class in Research Corp.
v. Asgrow Seed Co., 59 a patent infringement class action maintained under (b)(1) and (b)(2) and an antitrust action maintained
under (b)(3). The court held that an absentee who has received
notice of a settlement hearing must take certain "minimal steps"
in response to the notice, to preserve his right to appeal for the
class. Only if "a class member intervenes or even appears in
response to a notice pursuant to [rule] 23(e) and objects to the
dismissal or compromise, . . .[does he have] a right to appeal
from an adverse final judgment."' 6 0 The court explained that
the purpose of this seemingly harsh requirement is "to encour6
age or even to permit settlement" of class actions.' '
In Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co.,162 the Third
Circuit reached a conclusion contrary to that of the Seventh
Circuit, holding that aggrieved absentees in a (b)(3) action can
appeal from a settlement order, even when they had learned the
terms of the proposed settlement before the deadline for opting
out had passed. The court did not consider receipt of notice to
have deprived absentees of the right to appeal:
interest of some members conflicted with that of the class for whom suit was brought,
because
those with conflicting interests are not bound by the judgment in the class
action. This is on the theory that they are not members of the class. The class
suit, although binding on all members for whom the suitors may speak, is not
binding on those whose interests are at variance with the position taken by the
true members of the class.
In other words, under the Hansberry opinion, the doctrine of resjudicata
does not bind those who assert a position adverse to that stated by those who
bring the class suit.
Id. at 91 (dictum).
151All absentees have the right to appeal litigated final orders of the district court,
even those who could have excluded themselves from the class during trial. Ace Heating
& Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30, 32 (3d Cir. 1971).
159425 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970).
160 d. at 1060; see 3B J. MooRE, supra note 24,
23.80[51, at 1557.
161425 F.2d at 1060.
162 453

F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1971).
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In such a case there may be less need to police settlements, since the question of fairness is left to the informed choice of the class members. Nevertheless, ...
[i]t is possible that, within a class, a group of small
claimants might be unfavorably treated by the terms of
a proposed settlement. For them, the option to join is in
reality no option at all.... So, without court approval and
a subsequent right to ask for review, such claimants
would be faced with equally unpalatable alternatives
nothing at all or a possibly unfair
-accept either
63
settlement.1
The court noted rule 23's recognition that "many small claimants
frequently have no litigable claim unless aggregated" and that
small claimants could be treated unfairly in a settlement, contrary to the4 rule's command that representation be fair and
6
adequate.'
The situation posited in Ace Heating is not uncommon in the
class action field. Its holding lends support to the thesis that
inadequate representation, even after receipt of notice of the suit
and perhaps of the very terms of a settlement, warrants some
form of relief for absentees. Yet one might infer from Research
Corp. that an absentee who makes no objections to the representation and who fails to appear at settlement hearings should be
barred from obtaining relief from judgment.
It might be fair to require a (b)(3) absentee to object to a
proposed settlement to preserve his right to appeal, but such a
requirement should not necessarily apply to an absentee seeking
relief from judgment. The right to be relieved from a judgment
on due process grounds is more fundamental than the right to
appeal a settlement order, especially if the appeal would be
taken for the whole class or might adversely affect the interests
of other members, who acquiesced in the original settlement.
The absentee requesting relief from judgment seeks not to impose his terms upon the class and upon the opposing party, but
rather to be relieved of the judgment altogether. And relief
from judgment will only be granted if the absentee can prove
that he was denied due process.' 6 5 In such a case there should be
163 Id. at 33 (emphasis supplied).
164Id. The result and reasoning in Ace Heating were applauded in Note, Antitrust

-Federal Procedure-Attorneys' Fees and Right to Appeal, 47 TUL. L. REV. 193, 195-96

(1972).
"' See text accompanying note 114 supra. It may be that requiring an absentee to
make his objections before judgment serves as a screening device by demanding of
potential appellants a minimum level of interest and participation in the litigation. This
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no requirement that he monitor the proceedings in order to
appear at settlement hearings or to exercise his right to opt out,
unless he has been apprised of the actual settlement terms. Only
then would the interest in finality dictate that appeal or relief
from judgment be denied.
3. An Absentee's Duty to Monitor the Litigation
The most cogent and well-reasoned approach to this whole
area was formulated in Gonzales v. Cassidy,'6 6 a (b)(2) case in
which absentees were relieved from a judgment upon proof that
the named plaintiff in the earlier action had not represented
them adequately. The reviewing court formulated a "twopronged inquiry" to decide whether absentees had been denied
due process:
(1) Did the trial court in the first suit correctly determine initially, that the representative would adequately
represent the class? and (2) Does it appear, after the
termination of the suit, that the class representative
1 67
adequately protected the interest of the class?
In the first stage of the inquiry, the court asked whether the trial
court erred in its initial decision to allow the suit to proceed as a
class action. In the second stage the court reviewed the entire
course of the proceedings, with the benefit of hindsight. Neither
the trial court nor the absentees, at the time the initial determination was made, could have known all that the reviewing court
knew when it conducted the second inquiry.
The representative plaintiff in Gaytan v. Cassidy,1 68 the suit
from whose judgment the Gonzales plaintiffs sought relief, obtained retroactive injunctive relief for himself but only prospective relief for the other members of the class. Having received
full relief for himself, he failed to appeal for the rest of the class.
The trial court had determined at the outset of the suit that
Gaytan would be able to represent the class fairly and adequately.1 69 The reviewing court concluded that because of his
screening should not be necessary for petitioners for relief from allegedly void judgments.
166 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973).
167
Id. at 72.
266 317 F. Snpp. 46 (W.D. Tex. 1970), vacated, 403 U.S. 902 (1971).
269 "Gaytan was typical of the class within the meaning of Rule 23(a)(3) because he
did not have interests which conflicted with those of the class, and because his claims for
relief were based on the same legal or remedial theory as the appellants in the case at
bar." 474 F.2d at 71 n.7.

1258

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 123:1217

failure to appeal for the rest of the class, Gaytan had not fairly
and adequately represented the class throughout the course of
the suit. In effect, his claims and interests became atypical when
he was granted relief that was denied to the rest of the class. The
reviewing court's negative answer in the second stage of its inquiry resulted in granting relief from judgment: "Due process of
law would be violated for the judgment in a class suit to be res
judicata to the absent members of a class unless the court applythat the class was adequately reping res judicata can conclude
170
resented in the first suit.'
The Gonzales approach should not be limited to actions in
which the absentees had no opportunity to exclude themselves.
The theory of the amended rule-that courts must carefully
scrutinize representation because of the broader res judicata effect accorded to class actions-is most relevant to (b)(3) actions,
which have always been considered least amenable to broad
binding effect. Absentees in a (b)(3) action lack the benefit of
hindsight, mentioned above, as sorely as does the trial court. In
Gonzales the change in the representative's ability to represent
the class came about suddenly when he alone was granted
retroactive relief; it was easily discerned by the reviewing court
and thus seems an extreme case. But many other less obvious
developments during the course of litigation may impair the
ability of the class representative to protect the interests of absentees, and absentees who have not excluded themselves should
not be bound if it develops, as it did in Gonzales, that their interests were ignored.
The considerations and circumstances in Gonzales do not differ appreciably from those that would obtain in a (b)(3) action.
Brennan comes immediately to mind. The representative there
sought the same relief as the other members of the class, so,
initially, his claims were typical of, and not adverse to, theirs.
During discovery, however, his interests diverged from theirs,
enabling him to recover while the others could not, thus arguably constituting inadequate representation. The opposing party
in Gonzales, seeking to bind absentees by the first judgment, advanced an "estoppel-type argument" similar to the argument
that notice estops the (b)(3) absentee from claiming he was inadequately represented. Rather than arguing that the absentee
should have opted out, the opposing party in Gonzales said that
"since counsel for Gonzales was aware that.., the Gaytan court
denied retroactive relief. . , Gonzales is estopped to attack the
70

1

Id. at 74.
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judgment collaterally because he should have intervened in
Gaytan for the purposes of appeal.'

171

In rejecting this conten-

tion, the Gonzales court struck the proper balance between protecting absentees and requiring them to take affirmative action
to protect themselves. As the court pointed out, the "purpose of
Rule 23 would be subverted by requiring a class member who
learns of a pending suit involving a class of which he is a part to
monitor that litigation to make certain that his interests are being
protected; this is not his responsibility ....
An argument can be made that requesting exclusion is the
responsibility of the (b)(3) absentee, but such an argument overestimates the ability of the absentee to make an informed judgment about opting out and overemphasizes the sanctions attendant upon failure to do so. 1 73 If a reviewing court can grant

absentees relief from judgment in a (b)(1) or (b)(2) action (in
which the Federal Rules themselves deem the absentees to be
situated similarly to the representative) where the trial court's
initial adequate representation determination was correct, because the court finds after judgment that the representation
turned out to be inadequate, it would be wrong to bind a (b)(3)
absentee who makes a faulty judgment, or an informed judgment that becomes irrelevant due to later developments, not to
opt out.
IV.

CONCLUSION

From the deceptively plain framework of rule 23, a substantial body of law has arisen on the interaction of notice and
adequate representation. Cases dealing with due process requirements for representative suits range from the simple to the
complex, factually and conceptually. Assuming throughout the
situation of an inadequately represented absentee, one can imagine numerous variations on the theme, each requiring its own
resolution of the competing interests. At one extreme is the simple case of the (b)(1) or (b)(2) absentee, who never had a chance
to remove himself from the class. At the other extreme in factual
complexity but analytically almost as clear-cut is the case of the
(b)(3) absentee who could have requested exclusion, who knew
171 Id. at 76. Note that the court did not speak to the question whether Gonzales
could have appealed for the class without having taken some form of action. One of two
conclusions may be drawn: either (1) the court would have allowed an appeal as willingly
as it granted relief from judgment, or (2) the court would not have allowed an appeal but
considered relief from judgment on due process grounds fundamentally different.
172

I.

173See

generally text accompanying notes 89-97 & 103 supra.
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the exact terms of a settlement order, and who was not forced by
circumstances to remain in the class. Relief from judgment
would be warranted in the first case and unacceptable in the
second.
In the intermediate cases, courts will arrive at fair results
"[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances.' 7 4 In most
cases of the (b)(3) variety, the absentee who can prove inadequate representation should be relieved from the effect of a
judgment, regardless of his having received notice. This Comment began with the question whether such an absentee, with
notice of the suit and nothing more, can successfully attack a
judgment that purports to bind him. The courts have implied
that he can, and reason suggests that he should be able to do so.
More difficult questions arise as the absentee's opportunity to
participate is expanded. A (b)(3) absentee may have received
more than mere notice of the suit. He may have been notified of
settlement hearings under 23(e) and perhaps of the terms of the
settlement agreement, notices effectively inviting him to take
part in the suit. He may have been required to respond to discovery orders as a condition of recovery, or to intervene of
record to preserve his right to appeal. Any of these novel or
supplemental procedures, if adopted by a trial court, transform
the nature of the class action by demanding more participation
by absentees.
As the representative is divested of his almost exclusive control of the litigation, the suit becomes less a representative suit.
Whether this is desirable or undesirable is an issue unto itself,
but the trend away from exclusive control by the representative
harbors implications for the adequate representation requirement. The Constitution demands that representation be fair and
adequate if a person not before the court is to be bound by a
judgment. The standards for adequacy should not be lowered
when courts require absentees to assist in the conduct of a suit
through discovery, settlement hearings, or the like. Absentees
should not have to monitor the course of litigation, even if they
do have to respond to orders of the court.
Litigating the case is the business of the representative
party. Although each absentee should be offered the opportunity to enter an appearance or to request exclusion, those who
choose neither course should be guaranteed the next best alter174

Burton v.Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
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native to a day in court. In the class action context, that alternative is fair and adequate representation by the party who is before the court. Accepting anything less would violate the rule;
interpreting the rule to require less would violate the Constitution.
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